Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the Ethical Standards That Govern Summations in Criminal Trials by Medwed, Daniel S.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 38
Number 4 Summer 2011 Article 5
1-1-2011
Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the
Ethical Standards That Govern Summations in
Criminal Trials
Daniel S. Medwed
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel S. Medwed, Closing the Door on Misconduct: Rethinking the Ethical Standards That Govern Summations in Criminal Trials, 38
Hastings Const. L.Q. 915 (2011).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol38/iss4/5
Closing the Door on Misconduct:
Rethinking the Ethical Standards That Govern
Summations in Criminal Trials
by DANIEL S. MEDWED*
Introduction
Closing argument is a pivotal moment in a criminal trial. It
represents the last opportunity for prosecutors to convince jurors of
the defendant's guilt and for defense lawyers to show reasonable
doubt. As a result, criminal lawyers may be tempted to conclude with
sweeping arguments that pull at the heartstrings of their target
audience, the jury.' Scholars dating back to Aristotle have warned
that the most persuasive arguments often contain an appeal to
emotion-and that emotionally laden rhetoric can distract people
from making rational choices.
Legal ethicists have struggled with the issues surrounding closing
arguments, trying to reconcile the need to stamp out overly-emotional
appeals with the desire to empower advocates to summarize the
* Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law. J.D. Harvard
Law School, 1995; B.A. Yale College, 1991. I am grateful to Bruce Green for inviting me
to comment on the proposed revisions to the American Bar Association's Standards for
Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, and for his feedback on an
earlier draft of this article. I would also like to thank Rory Little for organizing this
symposium and Utah law students Chayce Clark and Jennifer Ku for their helpful
research assistance. Some parts of this article will appear in my forthcoming book on the
topic of prosecutors and wrongful convictions to be published by New York University
Press.
1. See Ryan Patrick Alford, Catalyzing More Adequate Federal Habeas Review of
Summation Misconduct: Persuasion Theory and the Sixth Amendment Right to an
Unbiased Jury, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 479, 514 (2006) (empirical studies suggest jurors put
tremendous stock in closing arguments); see also John B. Mitchell, Why Should the
Prosecutor Get the Last Word?, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 139, 151-56 (2000).
2. See Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1609, 1609
(2007). As Pettys notes, "an emotion can prompt us to act if we perceive that the action
will either reduce the unpleasant physiological sensations associated with the emotion or
sustain the emotion's pleasant physiological sensations." Id. at 1624.
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evidence as forcefully and creatively as they wish. These efforts have
fallen short. The American Bar Association ("ABA") Task Force to
Revise the Prosecution and Defense Standards has set out to change
this circumstance. The Task Force has submitted proposed revisions
to the Standards Committee of the ABA ("Proposed Standards").
The Standards Committee has responded to the Task Force's
proposals related to prosecutors' summations, and plans to address
the defense standards in the near future.
Part I of this Essay discusses the ABA's ethical standards
governing closing arguments as they currently stand, highlighting
their advantages and disadvantages. Next, Part II analyzes the
proposed amendments to those standards. Part III then considers
some questions that remain unanswered.
I. The Current Standards for Criminal Justice and
Summation
Legal ethics can generally be divided into two categories: rules
and standards. Ethical rules are binding; a lawyer's violation of them
may lead to disciplinary action. Ethical standards are non-binding
resolutions intended to offer guidance and promote best practices.
The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which most states
have adopted in whole or in part,' contain just one provision (Rule
3.8) targeted directly at the "special responsibilities" of prosecutors.
Rule 3.8 defines the boundaries of appropriate behavior surrounding
a host of prosecutorial functions, including the charging and discovery
processes.! Noticeably absent from Rule 3.8 is any reference to
closing argument. The Model Rules are likewise silent regarding the
explicit ethical obligations of criminal defense attorneys in making
summations. The rule that is arguably most pertinent, Rule 3.4,
provides only general guidance about trial behavior for all attorneys.'
3. See also Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 282 (2007) ("Forty-seven states and District of
Columbia have adopted some version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as the
code of ethical conduct for lawyers.").
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8 (2008).
5. Rule 3.4 states that a "lawyer shall not ... in trial, allude to any matter that the
lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or
state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2008).
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Drafters of ethical standards have often tried to fill this void.
The most recent edition of the ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice:
Prosecution Function and Defense Function, completed in 1993,
provides advice to prosecutors and defense lawyers in making closing
arguments. The standards are essentially identical for the two sides.
This approach is admirable in many respects: A blatant stab at equal
treatment for all advocates in the criminal trial process. Yet this
balanced approach ignores the reality that summation misconduct
varies considerably for prosecutors and defense lawyers given their
different systemic roles and, just as important, differences in how
jurors perceive those roles.
A. Prosecutors and Closing Argument
Prosecutors enjoy wide latitude to comment on the evidence
during their summations. The rationale is that prosecutors bear the
burden of proof in a criminal case and therefore should not be unduly
constrained at the end of the proceedings in arguing the merits to the
jury.' In some states, the defense gives its summation before the
prosecution's turn.' But in many jurisdictions, prosecutors are
entitled to present their closing argument first, followed by the
defense, and then to rebut the defense attorney's summation.' The
ability to speak both first and last during the summation phase is a
formidable advantage, a one-two punch of epic proportions based on
the psychological concepts of "primacy" and "recency." 9 By going
first, prosecutors can set the stage for the final act by framing the key
issues and anticipating the defense's chief arguments. This initial
crack at the jury puts the defense on the ropes. The chance for
rebuttal argument allows prosecutors to inflict a knockout blow on
6. Prosecutors have a particularly wide berth during rebuttal closing argument
where, pursuant to the "Invited Response Doctrine," prosecutors may respond directly to
the defense attorney's closing arguments. See, e.g., Michael Lyon, Avoiding the
Woodshed: The Third Circuit Examines Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in
United States v. Wood, 53 VILL. L. REV. 689, 699-701 (2008); Note, Rosemary Nidiry,
Restraining Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1300, 1333-
34 (1996).
7. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 260.30 (2002).
8. See, e.g., James W. McElhaney, Trial Notebook-Rules of Final Argument, 9 LITIG.
45, 46 (1993). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093(e) (2004) ("When the evidence is
concluded, unless the case is submitted on either side, or on both sides, without argument,
the district attorney, or other counsel for the people, and counsel for the defendant, may
argue the case to the court and jury; the district attorney, or other counsel for the people,
opening the argument and having the right to close.").
9. See generally Mitchell, supra note 1, at 156-95.
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the cusp of jury deliberations by reinforcing their basic themes as well
as responding to novel contentions raised by the defense.
Psychological studies indicate that last words are long remembered by
listeners."o And prosecutors can choose these last words essentially as
they see fit."
Yet prosecutors can abuse this freedom. Juries may trust and
respect prosecutors due to their public positions as government
officers who, for over 150 years, have borne the title of "ministers of
justice."1 Certain tactics by prosecutors during summations can
exploit this trust and respect to tilt the scales of justice unfairly
against the defendant. For this reason, courts have paid special
attention to the problem of prosecutorial misconduct during
summations, spending decades musing over the distinction between
"hard blows" versus "foul ones."" Drafters of ethical standards have
taken a similar tack in striving to map the borders of proper
summation behavior. 4
Delineating the full range of prosecutorial misconduct that crops
up during closing argument exceeds the scope of this Essay. That
being said, it is useful to highlight what Michael Cassidy has called the
"cardinal sins" of prosecutorial misconduct in summation:
* A prosecutor may not offer his personal opinion about the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. This behavior invades the
province of the jury. Worse yet, it may imply the prosecutor
has access to information that was not presented at trial that
substantiates guilt. A prosecutor may argue why a defendant is
guilty but must stop short of interposing his own personal
belief.
10. See generally id.; see also Michael D. Cicchini, Prosecutorial Misconduct at Trial:
A New Perspective Rooted in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 37 SETON HALL L.
REV. 335, 341 (2007).
11. See, e.g., R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 101-07 (2005). See
also Charles L. Cantrell, Prosecutorial Misconduct: Recognizing Errors in Closing
Argument, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. L. REV. 535 (2003); Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse of
Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 17, 35-38 (2003); Nidiry,
supra note 6, at 1306-08.
12. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the
Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35,39 n.10 (2009).
13. As the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed in 1935, prosecutors "may strike hard
blows" but not "foul ones." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
14. See, e.g., CASSIDY, supra note 11, at 101-07; Nidiry, supra note 6, at 1311-14, 1324.
15. CASSIDY, supra note 11, at 102. See also Cantrell, supra note 11; Gershman, supra
note 11, at 35.
16. See CASSIDY, supra note 11, at 102.
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* A prosecutor may not insert his personal view about the
credibility of a particular witness. This is known as "vouching"
for a witness. Just as the determination of guilt or innocence is
a job properly assigned to the jury, so is the assessment of
witness credibility. When a prosecutor improperly vouches for
the credibility of a witness, the statement carries with it the
weight of his status as a government official and may be
overvalued by the fact-finder. It is perfectly acceptable (and
common practice) for a prosecutor to argue that certain
witnesses should or should not be believed. In doing so,
prosecutors should steer the jurors to objective criteria-
witness demeanor, motivations to testify, consistencies or
inconsistencies in their testimony-and not to the prosecutor's
subjective impression of witness credibility."
* It is unethical for a prosecutor to argue facts not presented at
trial or misstate the nature of the evidence. For instance, a
prosecutor may neither misquote the words offered by
witnesses nor embellish the factual testimony introduced into
evidence.'
* A prosecutor may commit a due process violation during
summation by engaging in inflammatory arguments geared
toward rousing jury passions or prejudices. Examples of
inflammatory comments include appealing to jurors' sense of
patriotism, urging jurors to preserve public safety through
convicting the defendant, and introducing racial or ethnic bias
into the decision-making dynamic. 9
* A constitutional violation may occur where a prosecutor
during closing argument comments on a criminal defendant's
refusal to testify at trial. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution provides that a criminal defendant enjoys a
privilege against self-incrimination, signifying he has no
obligation to testify at trial. Any indirect or direct reference by
a prosecutor during summation to a defendant's failure to
testify insinuates that the defendant has something to hide,
thereby compromising the privilege and undermining his choice
not to take the stand.
17. Id. at 102-03.
18. Id. at 103-04.
19. Id. at 104.
20. Id. at 105.
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* Finally, a prosecutor may encroach upon a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by mocking or impugning the
integrity of defense counsel during closing argument.
Prosecutorial over-reaching during closing argument is among
the most common forms of error in criminal cases and has
contributed to a rash of wrongful convictions.22 In their 2009 study of
trial transcripts from 137 DNA exonerations, Brandon Garrett and
Peter Neufeld identified eighteen cases where prosecutors
exaggerated the implications of forensic scientific testimony during
summation.23 The case of Drew Whitley illustrates this
phenomenon.24
In August 1988, a man wearing a nylon mask demanded money
from a night manager finishing her shift at a restaurant in Duquesne,
Pennsylvania. When the victim failed to comply, the assailant chased
her into the parking lot and shot her to death. Another restaurant
employee identified Drew Whitley as the culprit. The Whitley case
went to trial based on this eyewitness identification and some forensic
evidence. The police had retrieved a trench coat, hat, and nylon
stocking from the parking lot. A technician from the county crime
lab testified at trial that the hairs found in the clothing were similar to
those of Whitley, but did not declare them to be a match. During
closing argument, however, the prosecutor insisted the hairs were
identified as belonging to Whitley. The jury found Whitley guilty of
murder. Many years later, Whitley's attorney petitioned the court to
have the hairs from the crime scene subjected to DNA testing. Those
tests excluded Whitley as the source of the hairs, prompting the
prosecution to drop all charges against him in May 2006.25
Exaggerating the nature of forensic evidence is just one of
several ways in which prosecutorial tactics during summation might
21. Id. at 106.
22. As Bennett Gershman notes, "[w]hen courts and commentators talk about
prosecutorial misconduct, they are often referring to the prosecutor's argument to the
jury." BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDucr 462 (2007). See also
Cicchini, supra note 10, at 341-42; Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid
Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-9 (2009).
23. See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 22, at 85-89. See also Robert Aronson &
Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech Evidence by Prosecutors: Ethical
and Evidentiary Issues, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1474 (2007).
24. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, Profile of Drew Whitley, www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/DrewWhitley.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). See also Garrett & Neufeld, supra
note 22, at 87-88.
25. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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lead to miscarriages of justice. On other occasions, prosecutors have
aided in producing wrongful convictions by advancing novel
arguments or theories during closing argument that were wholly
unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Take the plight of
Jeffrey Deskovic. 26
On the morning of November 17, 1989, the police found fifteen-
year-old Angela Correa dead in a wooded area of a park in Peekskill,
New York. Leaves covered her partly naked body. She had evidently
been beaten, raped, and strangled. She had last been seen on
November 15-by a man walking his dog in the park-and the
medical examiner estimated her time of death as between 3:30 and
4:30 that afternoon. Next to her body the police found three different
types of hair, plus a note written from Angela to "Freddy" dated
November 15, 1989. Over the next two months the police interviewed
scores of Angela's classmates at Peekskill High School, including
Freddy Claxton who was presumed to be the "Freddy" referred to in
the note and who had a solid alibi for the entire afternoon of
November 15.27
Jeffrey Deskovic, a sixteen-year-old student at Peekskill High,
did not have an alibi. In fact, he was allegedly absent from school
that afternoon. Witnesses described him as strangely distraught over
Correa's death. This conduct piqued the curiosity of law
enforcement, provoking detectives to interview Deskovic eight times
from December 1989 through January 1990. Deskovic behaved oddly
during these encounters. He even tried to assist the police by
conducting his own investigation, which mainly involved giving the
police his thoughts about possible suspects.8
At the end of one grueling interview session on January 25-six
straight hours of questioning and three polygraph examinations-
Deskovic allegedly "confessed" to the crime. Curled up in the fetal
position under a table, Deskovic gave a bizarre account of the
incident, noting that he "sometimes hears voices and they make [him
do] things [he] shouldn't" and that he had recently "realized" he
26. The following description of the Deskovic case derives from the Innocence
Project's synopsis of his wrongful conviction and a report on the case prepared at the
request of Westchester County District Attorney Janet DiFiore. See INNOCENCE
PROJECT, Profile of Jeff Deskovic, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/
JeffDeskovic.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2011); see also REPORT ON THE CONVICTION OF
JEFFREY DESKOVIC (June 2007), http://truthinjustice.org/Jeffrey-Deskovic-Comm-
Rpt.pdf.
27. See REPORT ON THE CONVICTION OF JEFFREY DESKOVIC supra note 26, at 1-2.
28. Id.; see also Profile of Jeff Deskovic, supra note 26.
Summer 20111 921
might be responsible for the crime. This interrogation was not
recorded despite the availability of an audiotape recorder. The police
arrested Deskovic that day. Without any eyewitnesses or scientific
evidence connecting Deskovic to the crime scene, prosecutors
subsequently filed charges against him for a number of crimes,
including rape and murder.29
The police continued their investigation after Deskovic's arrest
by subjecting the evidence collected from the crime scene to a battery
of forensic tests. In March 1990, just days after the prosecution had
obtained an indictment against Deskovic, the police received the
results of DNA tests conducted on the seminal fluid obtained from
Correa's vaginal cavity. The results conclusively excluded Deskovic
as the source of the semen. Tests also uncovered no link between
Deskovic and the hairs found next to Correa's corpse. Yet the police
did not drop the case against Deskovic in response to these
discoveries. And neither did Westchester County prosecutors.o
The case went to trial. The prosecutor acknowledged the
"wrinkles" posed by the DNA and hair evidence in presenting the
case to the jury, but used hard-hitting trial strategies to clear them up.
The government advanced strained and alternative theories of the
case, vacillating between arguing that (1) Deskovic had acted with an
unknown accomplice or (2) that the semen had been supplied by a
consensual sexual partner (most likely Freddy Claxton) and that
jealousy had propelled Deskovic into a murderous rage. These
theories did not make much sense. The accomplice theory clashed
with the core hypothesis that Deskovic was an awkward loner fixated
on Correa; the consensual partner contention had no evidentiary
support in the record. After the close of evidence, the court criticized
the accomplice theory, leading the prosecutor to withdraw his request
to argue it during summation. That did not prevent the prosecution
from elaborating upon its consensual partner theory during closing,
which is precisely what it did. The prosecutor insisted in summation
that "in all probability" Freddy Claxton was the source of the semen;
the note to "Freddy," in effect, was characterized as a love letter. The
problem was that this theory of the case was entirely unproven-and
arguably contradicted by the evidence.
29. See Profile of Jeff Deskovic, supra note 26; REPORT ON THE CONVICTION OF
JEFFREY DESKOVIC, supra note 26, at 2-3.
30. See Profile of Jeff Deskovic, supra note 26; REPORT ON THE CONVICrION OF
JEFFREY DESKOVIC, supra note 26, at 2, 10, 20, 30.
31. See REPORT ON THE CONVICTION OF JEFFREY DESKOVIC, supra note 26, at 21-22.
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* First, the prosecution had traced Correa's movements
throughout November 15, a timeline that left little room for
Correa to have engaged in sexual activity. Although the
prosecution intimated that Correa had had sex before the 15th
and that the semen had remained in her body, that theory
seemed dubious at best, especially given that it hinged on the
proposition that she had not bathed or washed in the interim.
* Second, there was no evidence that Correa was involved in a
consensual sexual relationship with anyone in November 1989,
let alone Freddy Claxton. Numerous police interviews with
Claxton, legions of other Peekskill High students, and members
of Correa's family failed to hint that Correa was sexually active
at the time.
* Third, even assuming that Claxton and Correa had a
clandestine sexual relationship, Claxton had a verified alibi for
November 15. From the time that school let out until well after
Correa's death, Claxton and four friends were playing
basketball.32
The prosecutor's efforts to attribute the semen to Claxton likely
sounded reasonable to the jurors. In the end, the jury found
Deskovic guilty of rape and murder, and his conviction was affirmed
on appeal.33
Deskovic maintained his innocence from behind bars.
Prosecutors ignored his pleas to run the DNA samples through state
and federal databases to check for a match. Only in 2006, after fifteen
years of incarceration, did his luck change. The Innocence Project in
New York City accepted his case for investigation that year and
managed to convince the new chief prosecutor in Westchester County
to conduct the requisite tests. Tests performed on the semen from
the Correa case in September 2006 produced a match to the
biological profile of Steven Cunningham, a convicted murderer
imprisoned for strangling the sister of his live-in girlfriend. When
confronted with this evidence, Cunningham confessed to raping and
killing Correa by himself.'
32. Id. at 22-23.
33. See id. at 23; Profile of Jeff Deskovic, supra note 26; see also People v. Deskovic,
607 N.Y.S. 2d 957 (App. Div. 1994).
34. See Profile of Jeff Deskovic, supra note 26; REPORT ON THE CONVICTION OF
JEFFREY DESKOVIC, supra note 26, at 4.
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The prosecutors' closing arguments in the Whitley and Deskovic
trials probably violated several of Cassidy's "cardinal sins," most
notably the prohibition against arguing facts not presented at trial and
misstating the nature of the evidence. The summations in these cases,
moreover, contravene the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards.
Standard 3-5.8, entitled "Argument to the Jury," is the guideline
designed to address prosecutorial misbehavior during summation. It
offers four chief admonitions:
(a) In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue
all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. The
prosecutor should not intentionally misstate the evidence or
mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.
(b) The prosecutor should not express his or her personal
belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or
evidence or the guilt of the defendant.
(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to
appeal to the prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would
divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence."
These provisions and the Commentary to Standard 3-5.8 address
most of Cassidy's "cardinal sins." Standard 3-5.8 specifies that
prosecutors may not offer their personal views on the guilt of the
defendant or vouch for witnesses; may only argue reasonable
inferences from the record without any misrepresentations; and may
not appeal to juror prejudices. Furthermore, the Commentary
clarifies that prosecutors should not "use arguments which are, in
essence, personal attacks on defense counsel.",6 Regrettably, neither
Standard 3-5.8 nor the Commentary explicitly mentions the
impropriety of a prosecutor citing a defendant's failure to testify,
even if such conduct arguably falls within the rubric of subsection (d)
as behavior that would "divert" the jury from its obligation to focus
solely on the evidence.
35. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-5.8 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
36. 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 35, § 3-5.8,
Commentary.
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Standard 3-5.8 touches on the major aspects of prosecutorial
misbehavior during closing argument. The bottom line, however, is
that it provides insufficient practical guidance when it comes to
evaluating prosecutorial behavior during summation-to
distinguishing hard blows from foul ones. The Commentary cites
"[p]rosecutorial conduct in argument" as "a matter of special concern
because of the possibility the jury will give special weight to the
prosecutor's arguments, not only because of the prestige associated
with the prosecutor's office, but also because of the fact-finding
facilities presumably available to the office."" The Commentary only
proceeds to give "broad guidelines" about misconduct by prosecutors
in summation, and prefaces its discussion by observing that "[t]o
attempt to spell out in detail what can and cannot be said in argument
is impossible since it will depend largely on the facts of each case."38
I applaud the effort to single out prosecutorial conduct in
argument as "a matter of special concern," but blanch at the
reluctance to give more detail. Without fleshing out the contours of
what is permissible, these standards fail to offer much aid to
prosecutors in adhering to them. 9 Even if ethical standards are not
binding, egregious disregard of them might violate ethical rules that
ban lawyers from making false statements to a tribunal, exhibiting
unfairness to opposing counsel or disrupting judicial proceedings.4
Providing more precise guidance about summations is essential.
Commentators have traditionally decried the reluctance of ethics
committees to take on prosecutors.4 1 While this state of affairs is
attributable to many factors,42 undoubtedly the vagueness of the
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 22, at 85.
40. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3-3.5 (2008).
41. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 707-08, 730-31 (1987); Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. REV.
275 (2004).
42. Ethics investigations usually start with the submission of a formal complaint
against a particular lawyer. Because prosecutors represent "the People," no individual has
a strong incentive for filing an ethics complaint against them aside from criminal
defendants whose allegations are understandably treated with a measure of skepticism.
See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. P~rr. L. REV. 393, 445 (1992); Fred
C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 749-50, 758
(2001). Criminal defendants have the motivation to file complaints, to be sure, but may
not have the resources to pursue their claims with the requisite tenacity. See Zacharias,
supra, at 749-50. Criminal defense lawyers may opt not to file complaints for fear of
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pertinent ethical standards and rules is one of them.4 1 Simply put,
Standard 3-5.8 provides little deterrent to prosecutors intent on
flouting its goals.
Consider the career of former Oklahoma prosecutor Robert
"Cowboy Bob" Macy. For more than twenty years, Macy served as
chief district attorney in a part of the state that covered Oklahoma
City.' His office amassed a record number of capital murder
convictions during his reign, including fifty-four in which he
personally served as the lead prosecutor. 45 Early in Macy's tenure,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals cited him repeatedly for
misconduct during summation. Macy often ended his signature "fire
and brimstone" closing arguments by collapsing into tears in front of
the jury box.' In reaction to those occasions where the appellate
court found his theatrics to be reversible error, Macy battled back by
waging public and private campaigns to unseat particular judges
whose appointments where subject to retention elections.47 Even
after several scandals erupted in Oklahoma City-including the DNA
exoneration of one of the men Macy had put on death row-Macy
emerged unscathed. He rode off into the sunset of early retirement. 48
The usual checks on summation misconduct (reversal, shame,
and political accountability) may not suffice to counter the handful of
overzealous prosecutors that resemble Cowboy Bob Macy. For them,
the imposition of disciplinary action in the form of suspension or
disbarment might be the answer. And for disciplinary action to be
viable, ethical standards and rules must grow sharper teeth.
B. Defense Attorneys and Summation
Prosecutorial misconduct during summation has captured the
attention of appellate judges, scholars, and ethicists because of the
antagonizing adversaries upon whom they rely for favorable plea offers and scheduling
accommodations. Id. at 749-50. Ethics boards may also fear retaliation from prosecutors,
many of whom carry political clout. See Gershman, supra, at 445; Zacharias, supra, at 761.
43. See Gershman, supra note 42, at 445; Zacharias, supra note 42, at 725.
Disciplinary authorities tend to enforce only direct breaches of specific prohibitions
contained in professional codes; this poses a problem in the sphere of prosecutorial
misconduct because the codes neglect to address many of the transgressions branded as
such in cases and commentary. Zacharias, supra note 42, at 725.






special influence wielded over the jury by these quasi-judicial officials
as well as the simple fact that this behavior is well-documented in the
case law.49 In appealing trial convictions, defense attorneys often
allege summation errors by the prosecution. This creates a record of
acceptable and unacceptable prosecutorial conduct for commentators
to track.
Misconduct by the defense, in contrast, largely escapes appellate
review.' By virtue of the Double Jeopardy Clause, prosecutors are
generally barred from re-trying defendants after acquittals and, as a
logical corollary, from appealing issues that cropped up during those
trials. One way in which defense misconduct during summation
sometimes comes to light on appeal is when a defendant claims
prosecutorial overreaching occurred during the state's rebuttal
argument, and the government's response is to contend that the
rebuttal was warranted under the "Invited Response Doctrine," i.e.,
that the defense's own summation opened the door for the
government's aggressive rebuttal." The lack of appellate case law on
defense misconduct during summation has complicated the task for
ethical code drafters seeking to define the contours of proper closing
arguments by the defense.
Further complicating matters is the defense attorney's role in the
criminal justice system. Unlike prosecutors, defense attorneys need
not harmonize their zealous advocacy with any competing
responsibility to serve as "ministers of justice." Defense lawyers
focus solely on advocacy. They are not required to carry a burden of
proof at trial. They strive only to produce a reasonable doubt about
their clients' guilt-and courts (and ethicists) are understandably
wary of stopping defense attorneys from trying to do so considering
the profound consequences of a criminal conviction.52 As a result, the
line between "hard blows" and "foul ones" for defense counsel is
even blurrier than the one demarcating appropriate prosecutorial
behavior from misconduct.
Some observers complain that defense attorneys should not
receive greater leeway than that afforded to prosecutors. Judge
49. See Nidiry, supra note 6, at 1314-15.
50. Id. at 1315.
51. Id. at 1315 n.102.
52. Id. at 1315; Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 543, 553 (1983); JACOB A. STEIN, CLOSING ARGUMENTS: THE ART AND THE
LAW 1-34 (2d ed. 2005). See also 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra
note 35, § 4-7.7, Commentary.
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Learned Hand famously lamented in 1935 that "[t]he truth is not
likely to emerge, if the prosecutor is confined to such detached
exposition as would be appropriate in a lecture, while the defense is
allowed those appeals in misericordiam which long custom has come
to sanction.", 3 One of the challenges facing legal ethicists is how best
to deter inappropriate closing arguments by defense counsel without
unduly interfering with the zealous advocate's right to demonstrate a
reasonable doubt in a case where the defendant's liberty, and possibly
his life, hangs in the balance.
Standard 4-7.7 of the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards tackles
the issues related to closing arguments by the defense. By and large,
it mirrors the admonitions for prosecutors.
(a) In closing argument to the jury, defense counsel may argue
all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. Defense
counsel should not intentionally misstate the evidence or
mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.
(b) Defense counsel should not express a personal belief or
opinion in his or her client's innocence or personal belief or
opinion in the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence.
(c) Defense counsel should not make arguments calculated to
appeal to the prejudices of the jury.
(d) Defense counsel should refrain from argument which
would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the
1 4evidence.
Standard 4-7.7(a) is perhaps the most important of these
proscriptions. Although "attorneys are entitled to reasonable latitude
in arguing inferences from the evidence," the Commentary cautions
that "[t]he rules of evidence may not be subverted by putting to the
jury, in argument or opening statements, matters not in the record.""
It is permissible for a defense attorney to harp on the prosecution's
failure to present a particular witness or introduce an item of
evidence, yet it may constitute a misrepresentation to make this claim
53. United States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526, 530 (2d Cir. 1935).
54. 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 35, § 4-7.7.
55. 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 35, § 4-7.7,
Commentary.
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when counsel knows the reason for the failure is that the evidence is
inadmissible.
Standard 4-7.7(b) asserts that defense attorneys may not offer
their personal beliefs about their clients' guilt or innocence. The
Commentary notes that "a lawyer's personal belief has and should
have no real bearing upon the ultimate issues to be decided at trial.""
What is more, "this prohibition is essential to the maintenance of the
appropriate independence of the lawyer from identification with his
or her client." 8
As with prosecutors, defense attorneys may not advance
arguments aimed at prompting the jury to digress from deciding the
case based only on the evidence. One notable exception is the
Commentary's concession that defense attorneys may argue "jury
nullification" (the doctrine permitting jurors to acquit when their
conscience moves them regardless of the strength of the evidence) in
jurisdictions permitting that type of argument."
It is unclear whether Standard 4-7.7 has done much to clamp
down on defense misconduct during summation. Misconduct of this
sort is difficult to detect and, to some extent, the system tolerates
allowing defense attorneys an extra amount of freedom during
summation. But this does not mean ethical rules and standards
should turn a blind eye to overly aggressive defense tactics in closing
arguments. To its credit, the ABA Task Force is giving this issue a
fresh look.
H. Proposed Revisions to the Standards for Criminal Justice
and Summation
A. Appropriate Closing Arguments by Prosecutors Redefined
The ABA's Task Force has proposed several alterations to
Standard 3-5.8 that offer more specific guidance for quelling
prosecutorial misconduct during summation. These recommended
changes reflect a sincere effort to give these rules sharper teeth, if not







(a) In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue
all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. The
prosecutor should carefully review the evidence in the record,
and not knowingly misstate the evidence or argue for inferences
or conclusions that the prosecutor knows are not true or not
supported by the record.
(b) The prosecutor should not imply special or secret
knowledge of the truth or witness credibility, or argue in terms
of the prosecutor's personal opinion. The prosecutor may,
however, state that the evidence demonstrates that the
defendant is guilty and that the evidence shows that the
government's witnesses testified accurately.
(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to
appeal to improper biases of the jury. The prosecutor should
make only those arguments that are consistent with the jury's
duty to decide the case on the evidence, and should not seek to
divert the jury from that duty by ad hominem disparagement or
appeals to improper bias or extreme emotion.
(d) When the prosecutor makes a rebuttal argument to a trier
of fact, the prosecutor should only respond to issues raised in
the defense argument, and not present or raise new issues. The
prosecutor should not intentionally reserve entirely new
arguments or points solely for rebuttal, unless the defendant has
an opportunity to respond. Also in rebuttal, the prosecutor
may fairly respond to arguments made in the defense closing,
but should object to defense arguments it believes were
improper and seek relief from the court, rather than respond
with arguments the prosecutor knows to be improper 0
Allow me to address these proposals systematically. Proposed
Standard 3-7.8 represents a vast improvement over the existing
guidelines that govern prosecutorial summation practices. First,
subsection (a) adds language suggesting that a "prosecutor should
carefully review the evidence in the record," an affirmative obligation
60. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-7.8
(Proposed Revisions 2010) [hereinafter PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS]; Rory K.
Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Prosecution and Defense Function Standards, 62
Hastings L.J. 1113 (Appendix: ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Proposed Revisions
to Standards for the Prosecution Function) (2011) [hereinafter Little, App.: Proposed
Prosecution Standards].
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missing from the present standard." Second, that subsection lowers
the mental state applicable to improper misstatements of the record.
The standards currently demand only that a "prosecutor should not
intentionally misstate the evidence." 62 The proposed amendment
inserts "knowingly" for "intentionally."" This is significant.
Prosecutors now can presumably circumvent the standard by
engaging in "willful blindness""-deliberately refusing to review the
evidence in advance and later claiming that any misstatement was
unintentional. Even if the precise definitions of willful blindness vary
from state to state, many jurisdictions specify that the conscious
avoidance of learning about the strong possibility of one's
wrongdoing is the equivalent of the criminal mental state of
knowledge.65
Here is a classic example of willful blindness. Suppose A is
asked by B, a stranger, to take a package to C in exchange for a
ridiculously large sum of money. A is suspicious but refuses to look
inside the package. A has no affirmative knowledge that the package
contains, say, cocaine. Under the doctrine of willful blindness,
knowledge is imputed to A by virtue of his purposeful avoidance of
confirming his suspicions about the illegality of his conduct.' By
requiring careful review in conjunction with prohibiting any
"knowing" misstatement of the evidence, Proposed Standard 3-7.8(a)
would likely cover this type of conduct by prosecutors who act like
ostriches and refuse to confirm whether they are mischaracterizing
the evidence. Misstatements of material aspects of the evidence, just
the kind of information that a careful review should detect, would
probably satisfy the "knowingly misstate the evidence" standard.
61. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(a); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60.
62. 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 35, § 3-5.8(a).
63. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(a); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60.
64. See generally Shawn D. Rodriguez, Caging Careless Birds: Examining Dangers
Posed by the Willful Blindness Doctrine in the War on Terror, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 691,
714-21 (2008) (discussing the general theory of willful blindness in American criminal
law).
65. Id. at 716 (noting that "willful blindness can perhaps best be sufficiently
understood as the conscious or deliberate avoidance of culpable knowledge-an
avoidance which is equally punishable for acquiring positive culpable knowledge").
66. This hypothetical resembles a well-known federal case, United States v. Jewell,
532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Likewise, Proposed Standard 3-7.8(b) offers more concrete
guidance than the existing provision. Instead of repeating the general
warning contained in the present version of the Standards that
prosecutors "should not express his or her personal belief or opinion
as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of
the defendant," the proposed revisions repackage this proscription
in more concise language and illustrate the reason behind this rule by
clarifying that "[t]he prosecutor should not imply special or secret
knowledge of the truth or witness credibility."' Equally important,
Proposed Standard 3-7.8(b) explains what prosecutors are allowed to
do-to state that the evidence shows the defendant's guilt and that
witnesses testified accurately.69
Proposed Standard 3-7.8(c) is a fusion of Standards 3-5.8(c) and
(d) with several admirable modifications. The proposal retains the
language indicating "[t]he prosecutor should not make arguments
calculated to appeal to improper biases of the jury," and goes beyond
the point of abstraction by spelling out that "[t]he prosecutor should
make only those arguments that are consistent with the jury's duty,
and should not seek to divert the jury from that duty by ad hominem
disparagement or appeals to improper bias or extreme emotion."70
This would condemn emotional outbursts like Cowboy Bob Macy's
fits of tears in far more certain terms than the language of the
analogous provision in the current standards. Curiously, the
proposal cautions prosecutors against appealing to jurors' "improper
biases" in lieu of the present standard's reference only to
"prejudices." 72
Additionally, Proposed Standard 3-7.8(d) contains precise
direction on the tactics that prosecutors may deploy during rebuttal
closing arguments. The amendments demonstrate that rebuttal is not
67. 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 35, § 3-5.8(b).
68. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(b); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60.
69. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(b); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60.
70. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(c); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60.
71. The current rules caution only that "[t]he prosecutor should not make arguments
calculated to appeal to the prejudices of the jury" and "should refrain from argument
which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence." 1993 ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 35, § 3-5.8(c)-(d).
72. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(c); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60.
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an opportunity to sandbag the defense with new arguments unless
there is an opportunity for the defense to respond. The proposal
also makes an effort to nip some of the more pernicious aspects of the
"Invited Response Doctrine" in the bud. At present, prosecutors are
theoretically entitled to respond to improper defense arguments with
improper ones of their own in rebuttal while claiming these comments
were "invited" by the defense.74 Proposed Standard 3-7.8(d)
recognizes the failings of this tit-for-tat practice, suggesting
prosecutors should object to improper closing arguments by the
defense when they occur and ask for relief from the courts as opposed
to launching barbs themselves during rebuttal."
All told, the Task Force's proposed revisions appear to take
enormous steps toward curtailing prosecutorial misconduct during
closing arguments. Whether they go far enough remains to be seen.
The effectiveness of these revisions also hinges on how they are
interpreted in complex, fact-specific scenarios that are bound to arise.
The ABA's Standing Committee on Criminal Justice Standards
is currently considering the Task Force's recommendations. So far,
the Standards Committee has scrutinized most of the Task Force's
proposals regarding prosecution functions, and drafted the following
proposed language for the rules governing prosecutors' closing
arguments ("Committee Standards"), tentatively renumbered as
Standard 3-6.8:
(a) The prosecutor's closing should present arguments and a
fair summary of the evidence that proves the defendant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from
evidence in the record, unless the prosecutor knows an
inference to be false. The prosecutor should review the
evidence in the record to the extent time permits before
delivering the closing, and should not knowingly misstate the
evidence.
(c) The prosecutor should not imply special or secret
knowledge of the truth or witness credibility, or express the
73. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(d); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60.
74. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
75. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(d); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60.
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prosecutor's personal opinion as such. The prosecutor may,
however, state that the evidence demonstrates that the
defendant is guilty and that the evidence shows that witnesses
testified accurately.
(d) The prosecutor should not make arguments that appeal to
improper biases or extreme emotion, or that contain ad
hominem disparagement. The prosecutor should make only
those arguments that are consistent with the trier's duty to
decide the case on the evidence, and should not seek to divert
the trier from that duty.
(e) When the prosecutor makes a rebuttal argument, the
prosecutor should only respond to issues raised in the defense
argument, and not present or raise new issues. If the prosecutor
believes that a defense argument was improper, the prosecutor
should seek relief from the court, rather than respond with
76improper argument.
Although Committee Standard 3-6.8 embraces the bulk of the
Task Force's most inspired suggestions, it is lacking in some respects.
The Committee deserves acclaim for retaining the Task Force's
requirement that prosecutors may not "knowingly" misstate the
evidence." I praise the Committee as well for largely adopting the
Task Force's expanded definitions of inappropriate vouching,
expressions of personal belief, and appeals to improper biases or
emotion. The Committee's description of what constitutes sound
rebuttal argument also generally reflects the Task Force's noble
vision of a rebuttal devoid of new arguments and outlandish
comments under the guise of the Invited Response Doctrine."
But the Committee refrained from echoing one of the Task
Force's boldest suggestions. The Committee shunned the Task
Force's recommendation that prosecutors must "carefully review" the
record prior to summation. Committee Standard 3-6.8(b) instead
indicates only that prosecutors "should review the evidence in the
record to the extent time permits."" This strikes me as inadequate. It
gives prosecutors, long hailed as "ministers of justice," an out-an
76. COMMITTEE STANDARDS § 3-6.8 (manuscript currently on file with author).
77. COMMITTEE STANDARDS, supra note 76, § 3-6.8(b).
78. COMMITTEE STANDARDS, supra note 76, § § 3-6.8(c)-(d).
79. COMMITTEE STANDARDS, supra note 76, § 3-6.8(e).
80. COMMITTEE STANDARDS, supra note 76, § 3-6.8(b).
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opportunity to chalk up a skimpy review of the record to lack of time.
And absent a requirement of careful review, prosecutors may have
greater wiggle room to contend they did not "knowingly" misstate the
evidence when they do make a material misstatement.
B. Defense Attorneys and Closing Arguments Going Forward
The Task Force's proposed revisions to the Defense Function
Standards governing closing arguments flesh out the skeletal
framework of the current standards and, in particular, offer much-
needed additions geared toward the controversial Invited Response
Doctrine. The Standards Committee has not yet studied these
proposals, but intends to do so in the coming year. Proposed
Standard 4-7.7 provides that:
(a) In closing argument to the jury, defense counsel may argue
all reasonable inferences from the evidence that is in the record.
Defense counsel should know or review the evidence in the
record to the extent reasonably possible. Defense counsel
should not knowingly misstate the evidence in the record, or
argue inferences that have no good-faith support in the record.
(b) Defense counsel should not argue in terms of counsel's
personal opinion. Counsel may, however, state that the
evidence demonstrates that the defendant is not guilty or
should be acquitted for some other lawful reason, and that the
evidence suggests that defense witnesses testified accurately or
that prosecution witnesses testified falsely.
(c) Defense counsel should not make arguments calculated to
appeal to improper prejudices of the jury.
(d) Defense counsel should not argue to the jury that the jury
should not follow its oath to consider the evidence and follow
the law. Unless prohibited by law in the jurisdiction, however,
defense counsel may argue that interests of fairness or justice
with support in the record should lead the jury to acquittal.
(e) Defense counsel may respond fairly to arguments made in
the prosecution's initial closing argument, and should object
and request relief from the court regarding prosecution
arguments it believes are improper, rather than responding with
jury arguments that counsel knows are improper.
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(f) Because the prosecution often has the last word in the form
of rebuttal argument, defense counsel should anticipate this and
craft the defense closing argument to anticipate the
government's rebuttal.
(g) If defense counsel believes the prosecution's rebuttal closing
argument has been improper, defense counsel should object
and consider requesting relief from the court, including the
opportunity to reopen argument so that defense counsel may
respond before the jury.
Proposed Standards 4-7.7(a)-(c) include subtle, yet significant,
adjustments. Subsection (a) indicates that defense attorneys "should
know or review the evidence in the record to the extent reasonably
possible."82 This falls shy of the suggestion that prosecutors
"carefully" review the evidence, but nonetheless creates an
innovative (and welcome) ethical duty for defense counsel. This
subsection also swaps "intentionally" for "knowingly" regarding
misstatements of the evidence," a shift that may deter defense lawyers
from engaging in willful blindness. Similarly, banning defense
attorneys from arguing inferences lacking good-faith support in the
trial record is an upgrade over the vague warning against misleading
the jury about the inferences it may draw from the evidence.'
Proposed subsection (b) is modified along the lines of the
comparable standard for prosecutors. It condemns arguments in the
form of personal opinion and just as clearly condones statements
regarding what the evidence demonstrates." The Task Force
recommends keeping subsection (c) largely intact, except for the
inclusion of "improper" before "prejudices."" This is an interesting
81. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-7.7 (Proposed
Revisions 2010) [hereinafter PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS]; Rory K. Little, The Role
of Reporter for a Law Project, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 747 (Appendix: ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice: Proposed Revisions to Standards for the Defense Function) (2011)
[hereinafter Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards].
82. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 81, § 4-7.7(a); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 81.
83. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 81, § 4-7.7(a); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 81.
84. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 81, § 4-7.7(a); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 81.
85. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 81, § 4-7.7(b); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 81.
86. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 81, § 4-7.7(c); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 81.
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addition, the consequences of which are discussed in Part III of this
Essay.
Another notable provision is Proposed Standard 4-7.7(d). The
current standards omit any reference to the issue of defense attorneys
calling for jury nullification, leaving the matter for the Commentary
alone. Subsection (d) changes this. The upshot is a denunciation of
defense attorneys trying to seduce juries into violating their oath by
blatant nullification, while at the same time acknowledging the
propriety of appeals in certain jurisdictions to "fairness or justice" to
warrant an acquittal where there is support in the record for such a
result.
As a final matter, Proposed Standards 4-7.7(e)-(g) admirably
grapple with the interconnected problems of the Invited Response
Doctrine and prosecutorial rebuttal. Subsection (e) seeks to solve
this problem altogether by restricting the manner in which defense
counsel may respond to arguments made in the prosecution's initial
closing argument that the attorney deems improper. Instead of
reacting to improper prosecutorial argument in kind, subsection (e)
advises defense attorneys to object and request appropriate relief
from the court. 8 Moreover, subsection (f) encourages foresight on
the part of defense attorneys by urging them to formulate closing
arguments that anticipate the government's rebuttal.89 Last, but not
least, subsection (g) deals with the issue of how defense counsel
should react when she perceives there to be prosecutorial
overreaching during rebuttal. The stance taken by the Task Force is
that defense lawyers should object and seek relief from the courts,
including the possibility of granting the defense the chance to reply to
the prosecution's rebuttal."
87. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 81, § 4-7.7(d); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 81. There is ample case law on the topic of
defense lawyers urging jurors to nullify. See, e.g., United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d
1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a trial judge may block defense attorneys' attempts
to "serenade a jury with the siren song of nullification").
88. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 81, § 4-7.7(e); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 81.
89. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 81, § 4-7.7(f); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 81.
90. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 81, § 4-7.7(g); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 81.
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III. Lingering Questions
Let me be clear in stating that the proposed revisions fill many of
the holes left open by the existing standards. One of the greatest
virtues of the current standards (the breadth and flexibility of the
prohibitions) is also one of the greatest deficits (uncertainty
surrounding how to apply such sweeping provisions in practice). The
suggested changes aim to solve this problem by combining general
proclamations with far more detail about what is and is not forbidden.
That being said, some holes-or more accurately cracks-in the
protection afforded by the proposed standards are worth exploring.
A. Prosecutorial Reliance on Forensic Scientific Evidence during
Closing Argument
Scores of forensic scientific methodologies have emerged over
the years to benefit the prosecution of crime. Some forensic
identification specialties, like fingerprinting, are well-known. Others
are less so, like the field of "hair microscopy," which compares hairs
retrieved from a crime scene against those obtained from the primary
suspect.
Juries generally give significant weight to forensic evidence and
expect its appearance in every case, a phenomenon possibly hastened
by the proliferation of the television program "CSI."' Yet juror
reliance on scientific evidence predates the popularization of crime
scene investigative techniques through the mainstream media. One
study from 1987 found that nearly "one quarter of the citizens who
had served on juries which were presented with scientific evidence
believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have
changed their verdicts-from guilty to not guilty."" This is
bothersome. Evaluating the multi-faceted features of complex
scientific evidence is frequently beyond the ken of the average juror.
This creates an inherent risk that jurors wowed by intricate
terminology and the aura of respectability surrounding the expert
witness will accept forensic evidence at face value. Mindful of the
persuasive power of forensic science and ill-equipped to second-guess
the science itself, prosecutors regularly rely on forensic evidence to
91. Anecdotes about the "CSI Effect" are legendary, but it is unclear whether this
phenomenon actually exists. See, e.g., Hon. Donald Shelton et al., A Study of Juror
Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the "CSI Effect" Exist?, 9
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 333 (2006).
92. See Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert
Witnesses, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1494 n.7 (2007).
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cement their cases when it is available.93 And, more on point for this
Essay, prosecutors may dwell on that evidence during their closing
arguments. This raises important ethical issues in cases where the
underlying basis for the forensic evidence is questionable.
Unreliable forensic science surfaces repeatedly in studies of
wrongful convictions. A 2010 report issued by the Innocence Project
in New York City concluded that fifty-two percent of the first 250
DNA exonerations of innocent prisoners involved the presentation of
erroneous forensic evidence at trial.94 Twenty-one percent of these
250 miscarriages of justices derived partly from faulty microscopic
hair analysis." Fingerprint evidence, long hailed as the gold standard
of forensic evidence, has contributed to the conviction of the innocent
as well." Even DNA testing is not entirely immune to the virus of
unreliability. Defective DNA comparisons at trial have led to
wrongful convictions on at least five occasions.'
Other methodologies less refined than DNA and fingerprinting
are even more susceptible to error. In one much-ballyhooed death
penalty case, Cameron Todd Willingham was convicted in 1992 of
murdering his three young daughters, all of whom died in a fire in his
Corsicana, Texas home. At trial, two local arson experts testified for
the prosecution that Willingham had set the fire intentionally. In the
ensuing years, investigative reports by journalists and forensic
scientists alike debunked the arson testimony from Willingham's trial.
Those reports proved too little too late. Willingham was executed in
2004.
One prominent example of flawed forensic science is Composite
Bullet Lead Analysis ("CBLA"). Starting with the investigation into
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the FBI and state law
enforcement agencies began to develop a method of linking bullets
93. See id. at 1528.
94. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, 250 EXONERATED: TOO MANY WRONGLY
CONVICTED 28-29 (2010), www.innocenceproject.org/docs/InnocenceProject_250.pdf
[hereinafter 250 EXONERATED].
95. See id. at 30.
96. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. 7 CRIMINOLOGY 985 (2005).
97. See 250 EXONERATED, supra note 94, at 31. See also Brandon L. Garrett, Judging
Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 84 (2008).
98. See David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, THE NEW
YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009; Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Man Executed on Disproved
Forensics, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2004; see also Fire that Killed His Three Children Could
Have Been Accidental, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9,2004.
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found at a crime scene to a box of ammunition in the possession of a
suspect." Investigators would conduct tests on the lead alloy of the
bullets to determine whether the concentrations of seven elements
normally present in bullet lead (arsenic, tin, cadmium, antimony,
bismuth, silver, and copper) were "analytically indistinguishable"
between the two samples.'"m The chief problem with this forensic
discipline revolved around pinpointing when two items were
"analytically indistinguishable."' 0' Although courts routinely
admitted this evidence for decades, there had been few scientific
studies on the subject, and by the early 2000s the methodology was
increasingly under attack. A federal district court excluded CBLA
evidence as unreliable in 2003. This served as a critical step on the
path to CBLA's demise. The National Academy of Sciences
published a 2004 report criticizing the scientific underpinnings of this
evidence, prompting the FBI to cease CBLA testing in 2005.10
Several state courts have subsequently refused to admit CBLA
evidence."
It is well within bounds for prosecutors during summation to
refer to the forensic scientific evidence introduced in the case. In fact,
any prosecutor worth his salt should cite this evidence during closing
argument. Potential ethical pitfalls lie in situations where (a) the
prosecutor overstates or misstates the nature of the expert witness's
testimony or (b) there is reason to believe that the underlying science
is flawed, e.g., hair microscopy or CBLA. Overstating or misstating
the findings contained in an expert witness's testimony-as in the
Whitley case described above'"-would likely violate Proposed
Standard 3-7.8(a). If a prosecutor conducted the requisite careful
review of the record prior to closing argument and later insisted that,
contrary to the record, the expert witness found a match to the
defendant, that behavior would almost surely comprise a knowing
misstatement of the evidence. At the very least, it would point to a
less-than-careful review of the record. Either way, this action would
violate subsection (a) of the Task Force's proposal.
99. See Paul C. Giannelli, Composite Bullet Lead Analysis: An Update, 23 ABA





104. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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It is less clear whether this conduct would violate Committee
Standard 3-6.8(b). A prosecutor who scarcely reviewed the record
due to time constraints could claim he did not "knowingly" misstate
the evidence and remain within the ethical boundaries drafted by the
Committee.'o This is one reason why the Task Force's requirement
of a careful review of the record by prosecutors in advance of
summation is superior to the Committee's less demanding suggestion.
Referring to unreliable forensic science during closing argument
by prosecutors is a trickier matter from an ethical standpoint. Judges,
not prosecutors, shoulder the basic responsibility of screening out
unreliable evidence. Even if a prosecutor wanted to admit unreliable
forensic evidence at trial, the judge ideally would exclude it. But as
with so many aspects of criminal law, the ideal world does not square
with the real one.
Prior to 1993, the admission of scientific evidence hinged on
whether a particular discipline had gained "general acceptance" in
the relevant scientific community.' This was a boon for the forensic
sciences. As long as a discipline had achieved general acceptance it
frankly did not matter whether its scientific underpinnings were
untested or poorly supported. It also gave judges an excuse to avoid a
thorough vetting of the evidence. Courts did not have to examine the
underlying science with any modicum of rigor; all they had to do was
determine whether the discipline had achieved acceptance and then
swing the door wide open to its admission.
A 1993 U.S. Supreme Court case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow,
appeared to usher in a new era where judges would carefully test the
reliability and relevance of any proposed scientific evidence before
trial."'8 Although Daubert suggested that judges should consider
''general acceptance" in weighing the propriety of admitting scientific
evidence, the opinion indicated that this issue took a backseat to
more pertinent factors concerning the validity of the science itself and
the procedures guiding its production." Only the most meritorious of
forensic evidence would seemingly survive this gate-keeping function
of the court. This led to renewed attacks on such generally accepted
105. COMMITTEE STANDARDS, supra note 76, § 3-6.8(b).
106. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
107. See Michael J. Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys,
49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421,422-23 (2001).
108. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
109. Id.
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disciplines as handwriting evidence, hair microscopy, fingerprinting,
and bite mark analysis. 0
Yet the promise of Daubert remains unfulfilled in criminal cases
nearly twenty years later. While judges appear to be circumspect in
evaluating scientific evidence in civil cases in the post-Daubert world,
a similarly exacting level of scrutiny is missing in the criminal context.
Weak forensic science continues to pour into criminal trials. This
may be attributable to a number of variables, such as judicial inertia
and the failure of the defense bar to mount effective challenges to
scientific evidence."' Whatever the underlying reasons, this
disturbing pattern means prosecutors occasionally succeed in
admitting unreliable forensic evidence at trial. And once that
evidence is admitted, prosecutors may emphasize it in summation.
Whether this behavior is ethically unsound depends primarily on the
extent to which the prosecutor is aware of the unreliability.
* Scenario 1. Prosecutor Is Aware of Unreliability. Assume
that a particular prosecutor has either read studies casting
serious doubt on the reliability of a forensic scientific discipline
or received training to that effect. If that prosecutor introduces
forensic scientific evidence of that kind and later asserts its
importance in implicating the defendant during closing
argument, has he violated the canons of ethics? Provided that
the data pointing to the unreliability of the science is extensive
and compelling, this conduct would seemingly violate Proposed
Standard 3-7.8(a)'s bar on arguing "for inferences or
conclusions that the prosecutor knows are not true"1 2 as well as
Committee Standard 3-6.8(b)'s prohibition on arguing an
inference that a prosecutor knows "to be false."',m
But the devil is in the details. Suppose the studies about the
forensic discipline are conflicting, with some scholars
maintaining that the underlying science is sound. In that case, a
prosecutor citing such forensic evidence in his summation might
stand on solid ethical footing under the Proposed Standards.
110. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 28 OKLA. CITY
U.L. REv. 1, 7-8 (2003).
111. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic
Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 896 n.12, 934-36 (2008);
Jane Campbell Moriarty, Misconvictions, Science, and the Minister of Justice, 86 NEB. L.
REV. 1, 18-19 (2008); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALBANY L. REV. 99 (2000).
112. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(a); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60.
113. COMMITTEE STANDARDS, supra note 76, § 3-6.8(b).
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As a normative matter, that is probably the correct result. A
prosecutor is entitled to focus on the reasons favoring the
accuracy of the forensic evidence when there is support for that
position, even if there is debate on the issue. The defense
attorney can always cite the science's flaws during his
summation.
* Scenario 2. Prosecutor Has Consciously Avoided Learning
About Unreliability. Imagine that a prosecutor refuses to bone
up on forensic science, putting his head in the sand and
presenting all sorts of scientific evidence at trial, some of which
can be classified as "junk science." Further imagine that the
prosecutor focuses on this evidence in his summation, knowing
full well that jurors are often overwhelmed by the mystique of
science. In instances where the unreliability of the science is
well-documented, e.g., CBLA, then the prosecutor has possibly
violated Proposed Standard 3-7.8(a) and Committee Standard
3-6.8(b) under a willful blindness theory.
* Scenario 3. Prosecutor is Reckless or Negligent Regarding
the Unreliability. What if the prosecutor neither knows about
the unreliability of the forensic science nor makes a conscious
effort to avoid getting up to speed on the unreliability, but then
urges jurors during summation to adopt inferences about
forensic evidence based on outdated and misguided beliefs
about its accuracy? Presumably he sits comfortably inside the
lines drawn by the Task Force and Committee Standards.
However, what if he is reckless or negligent in failing to educate
himself about the latest studies on forensic science? Suppose he
neglects to attend in-house training sessions or read the latest
scientific studies because he believes it would detract from the
demands of his caseload. It appears as if that is acceptable
behavior under both the current and the proposed rules. The
question is whether it should be. Perhaps we should
expect-and ask-more from prosecutors during closing
argument, especially when it comes to the hot-button topic of
forensic evidence and its unique ability to influence jurors.
B. Asymmetry in Requirements to Review the Record Prior to
Summation
The Proposed Standards impose new obligations on prosecutors
to review the trial record before their closing arguments. Proposed
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Standard 3-7.8(a) asks prosecutors to "carefully review" the record."'
The comparable provision for defense lawyers requires that
"[d]efense counsel should know or review the evidence in the record
to the extent reasonably possible."" This discrepancy may be
justified based on the different roles played by each side. Prosecutors
are quasi-judicial officers representing the state who must balance
their zealous advocacy with their duty to serve as ministers of justice.
Defense lawyers are zealous advocates, plain and simple. In short, we
expect more of prosecutors and the Proposed Standards may simply
embody that expectation."'
But is there any strong reason not to require defense lawyers to
conduct a similarly searching review of the evidence prior to closing
argument? A careful review would enhance the overall quality of the
argument and circumvent potential problems where a defense lawyer
who has made a misstatement during summation claims that he
reviewed the record "to the extent possible," which consisted of only
a cursory review because of competing time demands.
To be sure, requiring prosecutors to conduct a careful review of
the record-let alone urging defense lawyers to do the same-may be
unrealistic. The Standards Committee seems to have reached this
conclusion by replacing the Task Force's careful review requirement
for prosecutors with an admonition that they only study the record
"to the extent time permits.""' Call me naive, but I think that is a
mistake. Raising the bar for closing argument preparation might spur
prosecutors and defense attorneys to reach higher and improve their
performance accordingly. Keeping the bar low, while acknowledging
the day-to-day pressures of trial practice, will do little to enhance the
quality of summations and deter material misstatements.
C. "Improper" Biases and Prejudices
The Proposed Standards bar criminal lawyers, both prosecutors
and defense attorneys, from appealing to the biases and prejudices of
114. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(a); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60.
115. PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 81, § 4-7.7(a); Little, App.:
Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 81.
116. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kozec, 505 N.E.2d 519, 522 (Mass. 1987) (suggesting it
is inappropriate for prosecutors to "'fight fire with fire"' and noting that "the prosecutor,
as a representative of the government, must hold himself to a consistently high and proper
standard.").
117. COMMITTEE STANDARDS, supra note 76, § 3-6.8(b).
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jurors."' For the reasons noted above, the proposed changes are
preferable to the standards currently in force. One interesting, and
quite possibly innocuous, amendment is the addition of "improper" to
modify the biases and prejudices to which advocates may not appeal
in their closing arguments.' This adjective seems superfluous at first
blush. After all, are there any proper biases or prejudices for jurors?
Upon reflection, I suppose there are. A libertarian juror, for
instance, might have a general bias against the idea of government
intrusion into a person's private affairs. Would it be appropriate for a
defense attorney's summation to include indirect appeals to this bias?
I think so. Some jurors may have a prejudice in favor of police
officers, a feeling that derives not from any family ties to law
enforcement but rather from a worldview that appreciates the stresses
and sensitivities of police work. Would a prosecutor overstep the
bounds of ethics if her closing argument contained references to the
dedication of the police officers in the case? I doubt it. On balance,
the inclusion of "improper" in the Proposed Standards seems fine-
and potentially helpful.
D. Prosecutorial References to a Defendant's Refusal to Testify
One modest suggestion is to add a new subsection to the
prosecution standards specifying that a prosecutor's closing argument
may not refer to the defendant's refusal to testify and thereby
insinuate that he has something to hide. This compromises the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Granted, this
conduct would appear to violate Proposed Standard 3-7.8(b) and
Committee Standard 3-6.8(c) by implying that the prosecutor has
secret or special knowledge about the defendant's case. 20 It may also
offend Proposed Standard 3-7.8(c) and Committee Standard 3-6.8(d)
by diverting the jury from deciding the case purely on the evidence.12'
Yet drafting a separate subsection to address this issue would help
118. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(c); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60; PROPOSED DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra
note 81, § 4-7.7(c); Little, App.: Proposed Defense Standards, supra note 81.
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(b); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60; COMMITrEE STANDARDS, supra note 76,
§ 3-6.8(c).
121. PROPOSED PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 60, § 3-7.8(c); Little, App.:
Proposed Prosecution Standards, supra note 60; COMMIrrEE STANDARDS, supra note 76,
§ 3-6.8(d).
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make the impropriety of this conduct crystal clear, especially if
supplemented by a discussion in the Commentary.
E. Thoughts on the Commentary: The Balance between the General
and the Specific
The effectiveness of any changes to the ethical standards may
hinge on whether the Commentary provides sufficient examples of
how to interpret them. Although the amendments to the
Commentary are not yet available in draft form, I am confident they
will dovetail nicely with the proposals. I suspect the new version will
resemble the existing Commentary by giving concrete examples of
what is and is not permissible to supplement the broad language of
the standards. At a minimum, I hope the Commentary reinforces two
of the points raised above by (1) clarifying that "knowing"
misstatements of the evidence include misstatements stemming from
willful blindness, and (2) offering examples that chart the boundaries
between appeals to "improper" versus proper juror bias or prejudice.
I would also encourage drafters of the Commentary to err on the
side of inclusion in considering whether to mention various fact-
specific examples. One interesting aspect of closing argument is that
the appellate case law contains a treasure trove of representative
summation missteps (at least those made by prosecutors) related to
improper vouching, bald appeals to emotion, and the use of personal
opinion. While I respect the current Commentary's
acknowledgement that "[t]o attempt to spell out in detail what can
and cannot be said in argument is impossible since it will depend
largely on the facts of each case,"122 that approach is something of a
cop-out. Ethical standards are non-binding. They are geared toward
giving guidance to prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers in
making tactical decisions about how to structure their closing
arguments. Fact-specific examples about inappropriate strategies
serve to inform those choices. Just because it may be impossible to
make the list of examples comprehensive does not mean that the
Commentary should neglect to offer as much detail as possible. In
the end, prosecutors and defense lawyers want to convince the jury of
the merits of their respective cases during summation, but presumably
only through fair play. The goal of the ABA's Criminal Justice
Standards should be to encourage criminal lawyers in this process by
122. 1993 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 35, § 3-5.8,
Commentary.
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offering clear, concrete direction about the scope of proper
behavior.'23
Conclusion
Closing arguments can greatly influence the outcome of criminal
cases. Prosecutors and defense lawyers alike are generally permitted
to take the gloves off, so to speak, and battle for the jury's attention.
Some punches inevitably strike below the belt. The ABA Task Force
to Revise the Prosecution and Defense Standards has attempted to
catalogue and define foul blows during summation. For the most
part, the Task Force has done an exceptional job of refereeing in this
area. I anticipate that its proposed revisions, with only a few minor
adjustments, will ultimately go a long way toward promoting greater
fair play during this critical stage of the criminal trial process.
123. One potential problem with offering too much detail is the possibility that some
lawyers may seek refuge in the examples-that they may feel entitled to pursue lines of
argument that are not specifically labeled as improper. The Commentary can address this
concern simply by emphasizing that the list of examples is illustrative, not exhaustive.
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